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I found the paper extremely interesting as an assessment of where we were, where we 
are and where we are going from here. In my response, I would like to address some 
of the broader conclusions that the paper put forward. Of course, it is hard to disagree 
with the importance of multilateralism as the ultimate shock absorber. More 
specifically, the WTO should be seen as the fundamental and ultimate stabilizer in the 
global system. 
 
Instead, I would point to the notion of belief in free trade and multilateralism; what is 
happening to it and how broadly is it still shared? Also, what dangers could arise from 
its erosion? 
 
As for the timeframe being covered, the paper obviously makes a valuable 
contribution for its depth in going back before what most trade policymakers usually 
have in mind. They tend to start their analysis at the Great Depression and the Smoot-
Hawley tariff. Also, I found the parallel of the 19
th century “spaghetti bowl” with 
today’s free trade agreements highly illuminating. Yet, I would still propose a closer 
look at post-war trade history. In particular, I would divide up this period into three 
sub-periods and offer a brief discussion on each. 
 
The first of these sub-periods, the immediate post-war period was characterized by the 
dominance of the United States in the world economy and world trade. Other 
economies were just about to recover from the ruins of war, so the US could enjoy 
unparalleled dominance.  
 
The second sub-period was one of rapid globalization. The trading system saw the 
resurgence of European economies as well as the emergence of Japan and the Asian 
tigers as new important players. This is also the time when the first signs of tensions 
and pressures began to emerge, testing the system’s resilience. I personally remember 
the growing disillusionment with the GATT in the United States in response to a 
growing perception that it had become more advantageous for emerging export-
oriented countries vis-à-vis the U.S. On both sides of the Atlantics, the same question 
was voiced over and over again: is our commitment to free global trade still in our 
best interest? 
 
That said, despite all these tensions the system had been strengthened by the end of 
the second sub-period, perhaps best epitomized by the birth of the WTO itself. Hardly 
coincidentally, this period saw a relatively stable pattern of growing prosperity, only 
occasionally interrupted by regional crises in Latin American and East Asia. 
 
That brings us to our final sub-period, the one following the 2008-2009 downturn. 
There are new, dominant players in the world economy – namely, China. We are also 
experiencing the relative decline of the United States and other industrialized 
economies with significant consequences for support of multilateralism. High 
unemployment and the decline of manufacturing are hardly propitious developments for maintaining such support. A common complaint I hear all the time in the West is 
that the Doha Round was supposed to be a development round, but the designated 
beneficiaries are already doing much better than we are. Why then – the sceptics tend 
to ask – would we agree to asymmetrical terms benefiting the fast growers? 
 
These symptoms underscore a broader problem of multilateral trade: what arguments 
will be advanced in favour of the next stage of liberalization and rules? We used to 
think that agriculture would be the main offer on the table from the developed nations, 
with a commitment to make it look more like industry in terms of tariff levels and 
subsidies. However, the rationale for this has become less compelling over time, not 
least because of high commodity prices. Agriculture has thus become less of a driving 
force to bring people to the negotiation table together. The EU and the US, in turn, do 
not see potential gains to achieve on the industry side. The question is thus what will 
get participants excited about the next stage, what arguments will suggest benefits that 
they can hope to achieve? 
 
Differently put, I see the Doha Round extremely hard to sell in terms of political 
constituencies. Academics tend to refer to the “bicycle theory”, whereby forward 
momentum is needed to maintain belief in the system. However, right now, it doesn’t 
seem to be sufficient to generate further liberalization. I have ample experience – just 
like my colleague from the U.S., Charlene Barshefsky does – in selling the Uruguay 
round before. Now, however, I just don’t see the same degree of belief that would be 
necessary in going forward. 
 
To conclude, I think it is important to ask the obvious question which of the 4 periods 
described in the paper we would like to live in, if not in the last 50 years strengthened 
by rule-based multilateralism. However, if the erosion of confidence continues, it will 
be increasingly difficult to generate support for multilateral trade policy. 
Reintroducing full-fledged protectionism in the US is definitely not a viable solution 
to the problems. But if we look at some of the current proposals on the table with their 
“via America” provisions built into them, there are clear challenges out there. Unless 
a miraculous new stimulant emerges in the world economy, the ultimate question 
boils down to whether we are irrevocably moving into an era of eroding confidence. 
What will it take to reinforce belief in the ultimate shock absorber of the multilateral 
trading regime? 
 
 
 
 